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I. INTRODUCTION
United States v. P.L.O.' [hereinafter PLO Mission Case] involved a
* A.B. Princeton, J.D. Columbia, M. Litt., Ph.D., Cantab., Professor of Law, Pace Uni-
versity School of Law, formerly of the faculties of law of Addis Ababa University and the
University of the West Indies, member of the New York Bar.
The author wishes to express his indebtedness to Professor Michael Reisman of Yale Law
School, Leonard Boudin, Esq., Keith Highet, Esq. and Charles Cooper, Esq., whose analyses
of the Advisory Opinion of the ICJ and the decision of Judge Palmeri in the instant case were
presented at the panel on the PLO Mission Problem sponsored by the International Law Com-
mission and the ILSA as part of the International Law Weekend, November 4-5, 1987, at the
House of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
The author further wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of his research
assistant John Todaro of the Pace University School of Law. Special thanks is due Professors
Donald L. Doemberg and S. Prakash Sinha of Pace University School of Law for their helpful
comments on the manuscript.
1. United States v. P.L.O., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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conflict between United States law, international law, and an advisory
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The District Court
was faced with the issue of whether the Attorney General could force the
closure of the PLO Mission to the United Nations (UN) on the ground
that the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was a terrorist organi-
zation. Such a case raises serious issues of sovereignty, statutory inter-
pretation, and the proper role of courts in resolving difficult disputes that
threaten world peace.
The PLO Mission case might have resulted in catastrophe. Since the
United States is the host country to the UN, it has a special relationship
with that organization. If the PLO Mission had been closed, the United
States could have become an international outlaw with its role as host
country seriously impaired. Moreover, the PLO became the focal point
of the controversy which culminated in the ICJ's advisory opinion and
several cases in United States federal courts, making the matter that
much more controversial. For this reason alone, it is essential to dispas-
sionately examine not only the court decisions, but also the intricate cir-
cumstances preceding them. Otherwise, it is not possible to fully analyze
the appropriateness of the ICJ's advisory opinion, its impact on the
United States federal court's decision, and the correctness of that
decision.
The need to reconcile United States Madisonian democratic
processes2 with the international order is highly significant to our legal
system and public policy. A significant doctrine in interpreting the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the last in time doc-
trine, casts doubt on whether Congress is bound domestically to interna-
tional agreements to which the United States is a party. Briefly, the "last
in time" doctrine treats ratified treaties and congressional legislation on
an equal footing. Therefore, a law enacted by Congress after a treaty
goes into effect that contradicts that treaty, repeals that treaty as a matter
of domestic law. As long as the doctrine is followed, the nature of the
United States international treaty obligations remain obscure, binding on
the international level but only conditionally operative on the domestic
level.
A function of the separation of powers is to check decisions made in
the passions of the moment which compel action not in the best interests
of the republic. Perhaps it is appropriate that the final decision in this
2. The United States Madisonian democratic process is the constitutionally defined bi-
cameral legislative methodology through which federal statutes become enacted as laws of the
sovereign nation of the United States of America.
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matter was made by the judiciary. Yet, the decision was not appealed
and it remains only a district court opinion. Congress has chosen not to
act further-but it might. Consequently, what is offered here cannot be a
final conclusion, but only an analysis supplemented by one author's opin-
ion in an area of increasing importance.
II. THE ANTI-TERRORISM ACT
Basically, the conflict in the PLO Mission Case revolved around two
different interpretations of the Anti-Terrorism Act: that Congress in-
tended to shut down all PLO office in the United States including the
PLO Mission to the United Nations, or that Congress intended to shut
down all PLO offices in the United States except the PLO Mission to the
United Nations. A related question is whether this legislation intended
to bar the PLO because it is a "terrorist organization" (something which
is not defined) or because it is the PLO.
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 (ATA), which came into force on
March 21, 1988,1 states in its "Determinitions" that the PLO is a "ter-
rorist organization and a threat to the interests of the United States, its
allies, and to international law and should not benefit from operating in
the United States."4 Passed in the heat of passion, this legislation was
not subject to congressional hearings nor to examination by any congres-
sional committee.5 Moreover, the purported concern with international
law expressed in the legislation belied a disregard for it on its face. Sec-
tion 5202, the operative provision of the statute, provides:
It shall be unlawful, if the purpose be to further the interests of
the Palestine Liberation Organization or any of its constituent groups,
any successor to any of those, or any agents thereof, on or after the
effective date of this chapter -
(1) to receive anything of value except informational material from the
PLO or any of its constituent groups, any successor thereto, or any
agents thereof;
(2) to expend funds from the PLO or any of its constituent groups,
any successor thereto, or any agents thereof; or
(3) notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, to establish
3. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (Supp. 1987).
4. Id. § 5201(b).
5. See 133 CONG. REc. S13,855 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1987) (statement of Sen. Kassebaum)
("[W]e do have hearings scheduled in the Foreign Relations Committee ... [and] it is impor-
tant for us to have a hearing to explore the ramifications of the issues .... "). Senator Bin-
gaman said: "We need to further explore the issues raised by this amendment. It is an
amendment that has not had any hearings, has not been considered in committee, and one that
raises very serious issues of constitutional rights... ." Id. at S13,852.
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or maintain an office, headquarters, premises or other facilities or es-
tablishments within the jurisdiction of the United States at the behest
or direction of, or with funds provided by the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization or any of its constituent groups, any successor to any of
those, or.any agents thereof.
6
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this law (regarding motiva-
tion) is contained in Section 5201's findings of Congress:
(1) Middle East terrorism accounted for 60 percent of total interna-
tional terrorism in 1985;
(2) the Palestine Liberation Organization... was directly responsible
for the murder of an American citizen on the Achille Lauro cruise
liner in 1985, and a member of the PLO's Executive Committee is
under indictment in the United States for the murder of that American
citizen;
(3) the head of the PLO has been implicated in the murder of a United
States Ambassador overseas;
(4) the PLO and its constituent groups have taken credit for, and been
implicated in, the murders of dozens of American citizens abroad;
(5) the PLO covenant specifically states that "armed struggle is the
only way to liberate Palestine, thus it is an over all strategy, not merely
a tactical phase";
(6) the PLO rededicated itself to the "continuing struggle in all its
armed forms" at the Palestine National Council meeting in April 1987;
and
(7) the Attorney General has stated that "various elements of the Pal-
estine Liberation Organization and its allies and affiliates are in the
thick of international terror."
7
The 1985 hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the killing
of passenger Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly and infirm American citizen,
was the last straw for many members of Congress. Masterminded by
Abul Abbas of the Palestine Liberation Front, a radical splinter group of
the PLO,8 this brutal act of terrorism produced an uproar in the United
States and a demand for Congressional action. Senator Grassley of Iowa
responded with the ATA (also known as the Grassley Amendment),
which was added as an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Years 1988-89. The Amendment was added on the
floor of the Senate on October 8, 1987, despite the objections of several
6. 22 U.S.C. § 5202 (Supp. 1987).
7. Id. § 5201.
8. N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, § 4 (Week in Review), at 5. Abu! Abbas was retained as a
member of the PLO Executive Committee. Id.
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senators. 9 This spending bill provided funding for the operation of the
State Department, including the operation of the United States Mission
to the UN, and for maintenance and operation of the UN. 10 No provi-
sion equivalent to the ATA was contained in the House version of the
spending bill, and the ATA was only cursorily discussed during a joint
conference that covered the entire spending bill. After the House confer-
ees rejected, by a vote of eight to eleven, an exemption for the PLO Mis-
sion to the United Nations, they agreed to the Senate's version.11
The result was a Congressional compromise that enabled the elected
representatives to satisfy their constituents' growing hostility toward the
UN and the mounting sentiment against the PLO.'2 Without a trial,
Congress convicted an entire political movement of being a "terrorist or-
ganization." But punishment was not automatic. In typical fashion,
Congress gave that responsibility to the executive branch. Section 5203,
the enforcement provision, gave the Attorney General the power to "take
the necessary steps and institute the necessary legal action to effectuate
the policies and provisions of this chapter."'13 Moreover, under this pro-
vision, any United States district court has the power to grant injunctive
or other equitable relief.l1 However, these provisions would cease to be
effective if the President certified that the PLO and its agents "no longer
practice or support terrorist actions anywhere in the world."' 5
Describing the reaction of the Executive Branch, which is generally
regarded as being charged with the conduct of foreign affairs,16 the New
9. See 133 CONG. REc., supra note 5, at S13, 855.
10. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 101-204, §§ 101, 102(a)(1). 1987
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1331, 1335, 1336.
11. 133 CONG. REC. S18,193 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987); see id. at S18,186, S18,189 (state-
ments of Sen. Helms).
12. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1989, at A10, col. 1. Congressional critics of the U.N. continue
to seek to reduce funds for the organization "on the grounds that it opposes American inter-
ests." Id. This hostility is to a great extent engendered by a continually diminished level of
support in the General Assembly for U.S. positions. Id. Resentment in the U.S. towards the
PLO reached its peak when Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, was denied a visa to enter the
United States to make a speech at the UN because, in a statement issued by the Reagan admin-
istration, he "knows of, condones and lends support to" acts of terrorism. N.Y. Times, Nov.
27, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
13. 22 U.S.C. § 5203(a) (Supp. 1987).
14. Id. § 5203(b).
15. Id. § 5201(b).
16. See United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936); United
States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937).
The Court in Curtis-Wright recognized "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations."
Curtis-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. Suggesting that this was an area not to be invaded by Con-
gress, the Court also noted: "In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
1989]
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York Times reported Secretary of State George P. Schultz' reaction to
the prohibition on PLO offices in the United States as "one of the
dumber things that the Congress has done lately."17
III. THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT
The role of the United States as the host country to the UN was
central to the controversy because of the issues of international law
raised by the special relationship between the United States and the UN.
The significance of the selection of New York City as the principal
home of the UN is not to be minimized. The United States gained con-
siderable prestige, given the jockeying for power after the Second World
War. The practical effect was to establish New York as the capital of the
world, like Geneva during the days of the League of Nations. In 1945,
an invitation was extended to the UN by the United States, "one of its
principal founders, to establish its seat within the United States." 8 Fol-
lowing this invitation, the UN Headquarters in New York was estab-
lished as an "international enclave"19 by the agreement between the
United States and the United Nations [hereinafter Headquarters Agree-
ment].2 ° The Headquarters Agreement was an executive agreement and
not submitted to the Senate for its "advice and consent" pursuant to Ar-
ticle II, Section 2, (2) of the Constitution.21 However, the President was
authorized to bring it into force by a Joint Resolution of the Congress,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a
representative of the nation.... Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7,
1800, in the House of Representatives, 'The President is the sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.''" Id. at 319. See also Haig
v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 290 n.17 (1981); Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship
Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 109-110 (1948); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d. 697, 705, 707, 735 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) ("The President is the constitu-
tional representative of the United States with respect to external affairs."); L. HENKIN, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 178 (1972) ("The whole conduct of our foreign
relations is exclusively the President's."). This point was noted by The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York in its Memorandum in Support of Motion for Leave to File Brief
Amicus Curiae at 5, United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (No. 88 Civ.
1962).
17. N.Y. Times, March 12, 1988, at 4, col. 5.
18. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1458 (citing H.R. Con. Res. 75, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 59 Stat.
848 (1945)).
19. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1458.
20. G.A. Res. 169, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 91 (1947) [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement];
see also 1 FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 1947, at 42-46 (1973).
21. This process, requiring that treaties made by the President be approved by "two-thirds
of the Senators present concurring," is referred to as "ratification," but is not the same thing as
ratification of treaties following signature under international law.
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reciting the entire text of the Headquarters Agreement in full.22 This
had the effect of adopting the Agreement as domestic law.23
Section 11 of the Agreement (the Access Clause) states:
The federal, state or local authorities of the United States shall not
impose any impediments to transit to or from the headquarters district
of (1) Representatives of Members... or ... (5) Other persons invited
to the headquarters district by the United Nations . . . on official
business.
24
Section 12 provides that Section 11 shall be applicable regardless of the
"relations existing between the Governments of the persons referred to in
that section and the Government of the United States."'25 Section 13(a)
states that United States laws and regulations regarding the entry of
aliens shall not be applied to interfere with the privileges granted by Sec-
tion 11. If visas are required, they should be "granted without charge
22. S.J. Res. 144, 61 Stat. 756, 757-58 (1947).
23. 22 U.S.C. § 287 historical note (1982).
24. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 20, at 96. The other categories of persons in-
vited to the Headquarters district are: (2) experts working for the UN or its agencies, (3)
accredited press representatives, and (4) recognized nongovernmental organizations. Id. The
Joint Resolution section 6, which authorizes the President to bring the Headquarters Agree-
ment into effect on the part of the U.S., provides that "[n]othing in the agreement shall be
construed as in any way diminishing, abridging, or weakening the right of the United States to
safeguard its own security and completely to control the entrance of aliens into any territory of
the United States other than the headquarters district and its immediate vicinity .... and such
areas as it is reasonably necessary to traverse in transit between the same and foreign coun-
tries." S.J. Res. 144, 61 Stat. 767, reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 287 historical note (1982). This
would appear to be compatible with 13(d) of the Headquarters Agreement, which specifies that
except as provided above, "the United States retains full control and authority over the entry
of persons or property into the territory of the United States."
The Secretary-General of the United Nations was authorized to bring the Head-
quarters Agreement into force by the General Assembly, which approved the text of
the Agreement in its resolution 169 (II). But in the event that the provision in sec-
tion 6 of the Joint Resolution had been intended by the United States to constitute a
reservation, it was never made known to the General Assembly as such, and it was
never considered by the General Assembly nor accepted by it.
Finally, even if the United States had intended to formulate a reservation, it
would not appear from a reading of section 6 of the Joint Resolution that it could
have application to the present case. It refers to control by the United States of the
entrance of aliens to any territory other than the Headquarters District, its immedi-
ate vicinity, and the necessary area of transit. It appears from the foregoing that
persons falling within the classes referred to in section I 1 of the Headquarters Agree-
ment are entitled to transit to and from the Headquarters District, and that this right
of transit has not been made the subject of any reservation.
Memorandum by the Legal Department, 15 U.N. ESCOR Annexes (Agenda Item 34) at 2, 3,
U.N. Doc. E/2397 (1953), reprinted in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHECTER, & H. SMIT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 976 (West 2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter L. HENKIN].
25. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 20, at 96.
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and as promptly as possible."2 6 Section 21(a) of the Agreement (the Ar-
bitration Clause) provides for the arbitration of "[a]ny dispute between
the United Nations and the United States concerning the interpretation
or application of this agreement or any supplemental agreement, which is
not settled by negotiation or other agreed mode of settlement ....
The Secretary-General of the UN and the United States Secretary of
State each name one arbitrator to a panel of three. Together, they shall
chose the third arbitrator. If they cannot agree upon a third arbitrator,
then the President of the ICJ shall choose the third arbitrator.25
The UN was formed as a meeting place and forum for all nations,
and according to its Charter, formed to:
maintain international peace and security... ; develop friendly rela-
tions among nations, based on the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples . . . ; achieve international cooperation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or hu-
manitarian character... ; and ... be a center for harmonizing the
actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.29
In 1945, the entire world converged on New York, with 159 of the
UN's members maintaining missions to the UN.3" Further, "the United
Nations has, from its inception, welcomed various non-member observ-
ers to participate in its proceedings."31 As a result, several non-member
countries, 32 various intergovernmental organizations,33 and other organi-
26. Id. Section 27 of the Headquarters Agreement states that the agreement "shall be
construed in the light of its primary purpose to enable the United Nations at its headquarters
in the United States, fully and efficiently, to discharge its responsibilities and fulfill [sic] its
purposes." Id. at 101. The Secretariat, in a note to the Under-Secretary for Economic and
Social Affairs, Nov. 26, 1963, argued that "the essential element in the right of access [to
meetings of the U.N.] is that representatives of governments, officials of the Organization and
other persons invited on official business shall not be impeded . . . in connexion [sic] with
meetings or other activities in which they are entitled to participate." 1963 U.N. JURID. Y.B.
167-68, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/1.
27. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 20, at 99-100.
28. Id. at 100.
29. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
30. United States v. PLO, 695 F.Supp. 1456, 1458 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing U.N. Protocol
& Liaison Serv., Permanent Missions to the United Nations No. 262, at 3-4 (1988)).
31. Id. (citing Permanent Missions to the UN: Report of the Secretary-General, 4 U.N.
GAOR C.6. Annex (Agenda Item 50) at 16, 17, para. 14, U.N. Doc. A/939/Rev. 1 (1949)).
32. Specifically, these are the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Holy See, Mon-
aco, the Republic of Korea, San Marino and Switzerland. Id. at 1459 n.4 (citing U.N. Proto-
col & Liason Serv., supra note 30, at 270-77).
33. Specifically, these are the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, the Council
for Mutual Assistance, the European Economic Community, the League of Arab States, the
Organization of African Unity and the Islamic Conference. Id. (citing U.N. Protocol &
Liason Serv., supra note 30, at 278-84).
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zations 4 maintain "Permanent Observer Missions" in New York.
In 1974, the UN invited the PLO to become an "observer" at the
UN, 5 to "participate in the sessions and the work ... of the General
Assembly in the capacity of observer."36 "For nearly forty years, the
United States ha[d] acquiesced in the presence of such observer missions
and has refrained from impeding their function."37 "The Department of
State ha[d] never disputed that this right of access includes maintenance
of an office in which to organize and carry out official United Nations
business."38 However, a nongovernmental group immediately, but un-
successfully, challenged the right of the PLO's representatives to enter
the United States and to gain access to the UN.39
As a result of the Headquarters Agreement, the PLO has, since
1974, continued to function "without interruption as a permanent ob-
server and has maintained its Mission to the United Nations without
trammel."'
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONTROVERSY
The United States Executive Branch's position was that the ATA
required the closing of the PLO Mission to the UN and that this con-
flicted with the United States obligations under the Headquarters Agree-
ment.4' Hence, it conflicted with the United States obligations under
34. Specifically, these are the PLO and the South West African Peoples' Organization
(SWAPO). Id. at 1456 n.6 (citing U.N. Protocol & Liason Serv., supra note 30, at 285-86).
35. G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc A/9631 (1974).
36. Id.; see also G.A. Res. 3210, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974); G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 4, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
37. Koenig, Palestine Liberation Organization No. 88 Civ. 1962 (ELP), 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
833, 834 (1988).
38. Id. at 834-35.
39. United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Anti-Defama-
tion League of B'nai B'rith v. Kissinger, Civ. No. 74 C 1545 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1974)).
The Eastern District Court of New York rejected this challenge, and upheld the presence
of a PLO representative in New York with access to the UN. The visas were limited to a
radius of twenty-five miles from Columbus Circle in Manhattan. Judge Costantino stated:
This problem must be viewed in the context of the special responsibility which the
United States has to provide access to the UN under the Headquarters Agreement.
It is important to note for the purposes of this case that a primary goal of the UN is
to provide a forum where peaceful discussion may displace violence as a means of
resolving disputed issues. At times our responsibility to the UN may require us to
issue visas to persons who are objectionable to certain segments of our society.
Id. (citing Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Civ. No. 74 C 1545, at 37). On the legal
access issues as they stood at that time, see TOBIASSEN, RELUCTANT DOOR - THE RIGHT TO
AccEss TO THE UNITED NATIONS (1969).
40. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1459.
41. See Comm. on Relations with the Host Country: Report of the Secretary-General, 42
19891
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international law; although, the Executive Branch seemed to strain to
find some way to interpret the law to reach a different conclusion. To the
State Department the fundamental question was whether any criticism of
the legislation was premature, first, because the legislation had not yet
been enacted42 and second, because it had not yet been implemented. a3
The sequence of events was as follows:' When the Secretary General of
the UN learned of the impending passage of the ATA in Congress, he
expressed his initial concern in a letter dated October 13, 1987, to the
Permanent Representative of the United States.45 In discussions in the
UN General Assembly Committee on Relations with the Host Country,
the United States representative acknowledged that closing of the PLO
Mission would be inconsistent with the host country's obligations under
the Headquarters Agreement.4 6 He stressed, however, that it was "pre-
mature" to speculate on the "outcome of the legislative process."'47 This
was reported by the Host Country Committee to the Sixth (Legal) Com-
mittee of the General Assembly," and then to the plenary by the Sixth
(Legal) Committee. 9
A. UN Resolution 42/210B
On December 17, 1987, the General Assembly adopted Resolution
42/210B5° by a vote of 145 to 1 with no abstentions. (Israel cast the
negative vote and the United States did not participate) .5  The resolution
requested "the host country to abide by its treaty obligations under the
U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 136) at 2, U.N. Doe. A/42/915 (1988) [hereinafter Host Country
Report]. Ambassador Herbert Okun suggested in a letter to the UN Secretary General that the
provisions concerning the PLO Observer Mission "may infringe on the President's constitu-
tional authority." Id. Since it is not to be presumed that Congress intends to pass unconstitu-
tional legislation, it would follow that the executive branch could interpret the ATA as not
requiring the shutting down of the PLO Mission to the UN. Further, "[t]he Executive Branch
was still examining the possibility of interpreting the law in conformity with the United States
obligations under the Headquarters Agreement regarding the PLO Observer Mission." Id.
42. Szasz, Introductory Note to Documents Concerning the Controversy Surrounding the
Closing of the Palestine Liberation Organization Observer Mission to the United Nations, 27
I.L.M. 712, 712 (1988).
43. Host Country Report, supra note 41, at 1.







50. G.A. Res. 42/210B, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/42/49
(1987).
51. Szasz, supra note 42, at 712-13.
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Headquarters Agreement and... to refrain from taking any action that
would prevent the discharge of the official functions of the Permanent
Observer Mission of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the United
Nations" and that "the Secretary-General... take effective measures to
ensure full respect for the Headquarters Agreement and to report, with-
out delay, to the General Assembly on any further development in this
matter."52  Lastly, the General Assembly decided to "keep this matter
under active review."53 The General Assembly also noted the Secretary-
General's position on the PLO Mission. His position was described in
the statement of October 22, 1987:
The members of the Palestine Liberation Organization Observer Mis-
sion are, by virtue of resolution 3237 (XXIX), invitees to the United
Nations. As such, they are covered by sections 11, 12 and 13 of the
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947. There is therefore a treaty
obligation on the host country to permit Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation Observer Mission personnel to enter and remain in the United
States to carry out their official functions at the United Nations
Headquarters.54
Anticipating the adoption of the ATA by the Congress, the Secre-
tary-General wrote two additional letters to Ambassador Walters, the
Permanent Representative of the United States. In the first letter, dated
December 7, 1987, the Secretary-General expressed:
[T]he hope that it would be possible for the United States Administra-
tion, in line with its own legal position, to act to prevent the adoption
of the legislation; the United States Department of State had repeat-
edly taken the position that the United States is 'under an obligation to
permit PLO Observer Mission personnel to enter and remain in the
U.S. to carry out their official functions.' In the event that the pro-
posed legislation became law, however, the Secretary-General sought
assurances that the present arrangements for the PLO Observer Mis-
sion would not be curtailed or otherwise affected.
In the second letter, dated December 21, 1987, the Secretary-Gen-
eral informed the Permanent Representative of the adoption of resolution
42/210B by the General Assembly. He also asked to be informed of any
further developments regarding the pending legislation.56
On January 5, 1988, Acting Permanent Representative of the
52. G.A. Res. 42/210B, supra note 50, at 302.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Host Country Report, supra note 41, at 2.
56. Id.
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United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Herbert Okun, in-
formed the Secretary-General that the Act had been signed by President
Reagan on December 22, 1987 and that the section relating to the PLO
would take effect ninety days after that date. "Because the provisions
concerning the PLO Observer Mission may infringe on the President's
constifutional authority and, if implemented, would be contrary to our
international legal obligations under the United Nations Headquarters
Agreement," Okun asserted, "the Administration intends, during the
ninety-day period before this provision is to take effect, to engage in con-
sultations with the Congress in an effort to resolve this matter.
5 7
The Secretary-General wrote again to Ambassador Walters on Janu-
ary 14, 1988, "welcoming the intention expressed in Ambassador Okun's
letter to use the ninety-day period to engage in consultations with the
Congress."58 Nevertheless, the Secretary-General was obliged to point
out that the "assurance[s] sought in his letter of 7 December 1987 had
not been forthcoming and that under these circumstances it had to be
concluded that a dispute existed between the United Nations and the
United States concerning the interpretation and application of the Head-
quarters Agreement." 59 "Accordingly, the Secretary-General invoked
the dispute settlement procedure set out in section 21 of the Agreement
and proposed that the negotiations phase of the procedure commence on
January 20, 1988. " 6
A series of meetings occurred involving the Legal Counsel to the
UN, the Legal Adviser of the State Department, Judge Abraham D.
Sofaer, and the Legal Adviser of the United States Mission. The Legal
Counsel was informed in these meetings that the United States was not
ready to enter formally into the dispute settlement procedure since the
United States was still evaluating the situation and had not yet concluded
that a dispute existed because the legislation had not yet been imple-
mented.6 The United States also stressed that "the Executive Branch
was still examining the possibility of interpreting the law in conformity
with the United States obligations under the Headquarters Agreement
regarding the PLO Observer Mission . . .or alternatively of providing




60. Id. "The Secretary General named Mr. Carl-August Fleischauer, the Under-Secre-
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force of the legislation."'62
This meant that the Executive Branch was not absolutely locked
into an interpretation of the ATA that required the closing of the Mis-
sion. More significantly, this position indicated that the Executive
Branch could indefinitely postpone the entire matter by avoiding the
ninety-day period mandated by Congress. If this could be accomplished,
and the Secretary of State could persuade the PLO to renounce terror-
ism, the legislation would become moot and the matter disposed of with-
out dealing with the sticky issue of whether a dispute existed between the
United States and the United Nations under the Headquarters Agree-
ment. The ATA could still serve as leverage with the PLO to alter their
position on terrorism by threatening to close the Observer Mission in the
future. In short, everyone would be off the hook.
But this was not to be the case. The Legal Counsel of the UN re-
jected this position, stating that the question was "one of compliance
with international law."63 Quite simply, this meant that the Headquar-
ters Agreement was a binding international instrument and the ATA vio-
lated it. Stated bluntly, "Section 21 of the Agreement set out the
procedure to be followed in the event of a dispute as to its interpretation
or application, and the United Nations had every intention of defending
its rights under that Agreement."" The Legal Counsel insisted that if
the PLO Observer Mission was not to be exempted from the application
of the law, then "the procedure provided for in section 21 be imple-
mented and also that technical discussions regarding the establishment of
an arbitral tribunal take place immediately."65 The United States agreed
to such discussions but only on an informal basis.66 When the technical
discussions started on January 28, 1988, the costs of the arbitration, its
location, its secretariat, languages, rules of procedure, and the form of
the compromise between the two sides were considered.67
If arbitration actually began under section 21, it would be tanta-
mount to an acceptance by the United States that an international tribu-
nal had the authority to pass judgment on an act of Congress which had
not been declared to be unconstitutional by any court in the United
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id at 3.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2. "[Ihe United States was not in a position and not willing to enter formally
into the dispute settlement procedure under section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement." Id.
(emphasis added).
67. Id. at 3.
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States. This was clearly not acceptable either legally or politically for the
Administration. Its only tactic was to stall.
The lack of progress compelled the Secretary-General to write yet
another letter to Ambassador Walters on February 2, 1988. Noting the
lack of any assurances by the United States about the implementation of
the arbitration procedures, he stated:
The section 21 procedure is the only legal remedy available to the
United Nations in this matter and since the United States so far has
not been in a position to give appropriate assurances regarding the
deferral of the application of the law to the PLO Observer Mission, the
time is rapidly approaching when I will have no alternative but to pro-
ceed either together with the United States within the framework of
section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement or by informing the General
Assembly of the impasse that this been reached.68
Following a meeting between the Secretary-General and Ambassa-
dor Walters on February 4, 1988, the UN was informed that a decision
would be communicated to the Secretary-General no later than February
10, 1988. On February 10, the Secretary-General learned that the United
States administration had not made a decision about the PLO Mission
and would not make one until the following week. The Secretary-Gen-
eral announced his intention of making every effort to settle the dispute
within the framework of section 21, and because the effective date of the
ATA was approaching, he notified the General Assembly of the "im-
passe. ' ' 69 On February 18, the State Department Legal Adviser told the
Legal Counsel that the United States had still not made a decision con-
cerning the PLO Mission.70 Further inquiries established that no date
for a decision had been set, and there were no further communications
between the UN and the United States with regard to such a date. On
February 11, the Legal Counsel of the UN informed the Legal Adviser of
the State Department that the United Nations had chosen Mr. Eduardo
Jimenez de Arechaga, former President and Judge of the ICJ, as arbitra-
tor in "the event of arbitration" under Section 21. In so doing, he re-
ferred to the letter of January 14 to Ambassador Walters, formally
invoking the dispute settlement procedures of section 21 of the Head-
quarters Agreement. Although the Legal Adviser of the State Depart-
ment was urged, by virtue of the "constraints under which both parties
68. Id.
69. Id. at 3-4.
70. 42 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 136, addendum part 1) at 1, U.N. Doc. A/42/915/
Add.1 (1988).
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find themselves,""1 to notify the UN as soon as possible of the choice
made by the United States, no communication was received from the
United States.72
On February 18, 1988, the Permanent Representative of Bahrain,
acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Arab Group, sent a letter re-
questing that the forty-second session of the General Assembly recon-
vene.73 This was followed on February 22 by similar requests from the
Permanent Representative of Zimbabwe on behalf of the Coordinating
Bureau of the Movement of Non-aligned Countries, 74 by the Permanent
Representative of Kuwait on behalf of the members of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference in New York,75 and by the Chairman of the
Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian
People on behalf of the Committee. 76 Following consultations with the
Regional Groups, the President of the General Assembly reconvened the
forty-second session on February 29, 1988. 77
B. UN Resolutions 42/229A and 42/229B
The General Assembly adopted Resolution 42/229A on March 2,
1988,78 noting that the ATA was to take effect on March 21 and
concluded:
[T]he United States of America, the host country, is under a legal obli-
gation to enable the Permanent Observer Mission of the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization to establish and maintain premises and adequate
functional facilities and to enable the personnel of the Mission to enter
and remain in the United States to carry out their official functions.79
Resolution 42/229B, also adopted by the General Assembly on
March 2 requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ on the following
question:
In the light of facts reflected in the reports of the Secretary-General, is
the United States of America, as a party to the Agreement between the
United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Head-
71. Id
72. Id.




77. Szasz, supra note 42, at 713.
78. G.A. Res. 42/229A, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 1, U.N. Doe. A/42/229A.
The vote was 143 to one, no abstentions, with only Israel in the negative, the U.S. not partici-
pating. Szasz, supra note 42, at 713.
79. G.A. Res. 42/229A, supra note 78, at 1.
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quarters of the United Nations, under an obligation to enter into arbi-
tration in accordance with section 21 of the Agreement?80
Paragraph 3 of Resolution 42/229A was seemingly inconsistent
with 42/229B. The premise of Resolution 42/229B was that the relevant
provisions of the ATA were inconsistent with the legal obligations of the
host country under the Headquarters Agreement. However, paragraph 3
of Resolution 42/229A simply postulated that the "application" of the
ATA "in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 2 above would be con-
trary to the international legal obligations of the host country under the
Headquarters Agreement." 8 1 The Resolution did not define the meaning
of "application." If it meant application by the Attorney General, then
an advisory from the ICJ opinion would have been appropriate. But if it
meant application by the courts in the United States, then an advisory
opinion by the ICJ would have been premature until the statute was so
construed and applied. As the ICJ noted in the Interhandel Case:
"[T]he State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to
redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own domestic
legal system." 82 Following the second interpretation and the Interhandel
Case, the preoccupation with the ATA's effective date of March 21 and
the reports on the failure of the United States to conform to section 21 or
to respond to communications were unjustified. This position was based
on the understanding that the ATA is not self-enforcing. The Attorney
General must act, and even if he did, the President could still certify that
the PLO was not a terrorist organization. There was no indication how
such a decision would be reviewed, and whether or not the legislature
would reject such a certification. Further, the analysis in the Interhandel
Case suggests that before the ICJ could hold that the ATA violated the
Headquarters Agreement, the PLO would first have to be ordered to shut
down its Observer Mission and then exhaust its remedies in the United
States courts. This is because the interpretation of the term "in a manner
inconsistent" in paragraph 3 of Resolution 42/229A8 3 cannot be under-
stood until the highest court in the United States with jurisdiction so
applied the statute and forced the closure of the Observer Mission. Only
then would it be legally argued that the United States has violated its
international obligations under the Headquarters Agreement. With this
80. G.A. Res. 42/229B, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/42/229B.
The vote was 143 to zero with no abstentions; the U.S. did not participate. Szasz, supra note
42, at 712-13.
81. G.A. Res. 42/229A, supra note 78, at 2.
82. Interhandel Case (Switz. v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J 6, 27 (Mar. 21).
83. G.A. Res. 42/229A, supra note.78, at 1.
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interpretation, the Attorney General could also refuse to apply the ATA
on the grounds that he had no authority to violate the nation's interna-
tional obligations.
On the other hand, an advisory opinion is just that, advisory, and as
such, the opinion only clarifies an issue and serves as a reference point for
the American executive and judicial decision makers. If perceived this
way, the effect of an ICJ advisory opinion is different from the effect of a
decision in a contentious case. The Court in Western Sahara observed:
"The Court's reply is only of an advisory character: as such, it has no
binding force."84 Consequently, it could be argued that an advisory
opinion cannot be premature if it states that the application of the ATA
to the PLO Observer Mission might violate the United States interna-
tional obligations under the Headquarters Agreement. There would be
no obligation for the PLO to exhaust its remedies in United States courts
before the General Assembly could request an advisory opinion and
before the ICJ could render an opinion.
The PLO does not, itself, have standing before the ICJ and thus it
cannot be a party to the kind of contentious dispute that the Court can
decide.8" Also, the General Assembly was not technically seeking to re-
dress the grievances of the PLO, but enforcing its own rights under the
Headquarters Agreement to have a dispute with the Host Country set-
tled pursuant to section 21. Therefore, there was no reason to force the
PLO to exhaust its remedies under United States law before the UN
could take up its claim. However, this argument was unsound, since the
groups pressuring for the reconvening of the General Assembly were less
concerned about access and the Headquarters agreement than they were
about the rights of the Palestinians to self-determination.86 Notwith-
standing this, 229B was adopted, at least theoretically, to obtain just an
advisory opinion on behalf of the General Assembly.
84. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 24 (Advisory Opinion Oct. 16) (quoting Interpreta-
tion of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, First Phase, 1950 I.C.J. 65, 71
(Advisory Opinion Mar. 30)). But cf Eastern Carelia, 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 5, at 29. See
Janis, The International Court of Justice: Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, 17 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 609 (1976); cf Herman, An Analysis of the World Court Judgement on the Western
Sahara Case, 41 SASK. L. REV. 133 (1976). On ICJ advisory opinions generally, Szasz, En-
hancing the Advisory Competence of the World Court in THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 499 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
85. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59
Stat. 1055, 1059, U.S.T.S. No. 993. "Only states may be parties in cases before the Court." Id.
The PLO is not a state. See United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1459 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
86. Those groups were: the Arab Group, the Coordinating Bureau of the Movement of
Non-aligned Countries, and the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinian People. 42 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 136, addendum part 1), supra note 70, at 2.
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This latter approach would justify the authority of the ICJ to give
an advisory opinion, but the ultimate question is whether the court
should have done so as a matter of its discretion. Because the United
States is a member of the UN and the Host Country under the Head-
quarters Agreement, it should not be presumed to be in violation of its
international obligations.87 At the very least, it should be permitted to
demonstrate that, under its own procedures and at the appropriate level,
it can find a way to avoid such a violation before it becomes necessary to
condemn it at the international level. As a matter of discretion, the ICJ
could appropriately grant an advisory opinion on whether the ATA put
the United States in default under section 21 of the Headquarters Agree-
ment for failure to arbitrate a dispute with the UN after the highest
courts in the United States determine that this statute must be applied to
shut down the PLO Observer Mission. The ICJ was premature in its
willingness to assist the American courts by informing them of the inter-
national obligations of the United States before they had, in fact, been
violated and before an American judge had the opportunity to consider
those international obligations in light of domestic legislation.
The United States Representative to the UN was informed by the
Secretary General on March 4 of the adoption of Resolution 42/229A.
The Secretary-General expressed the hope the United States would still
be able to reconcile its domestic legislation with its international obliga-
tions. However, if this were not possible, he "trusted that the United
States would recognize the existence of the dispute and agree to the utili-
zation of the dispute settlement procedure provided for in section 21 of
the Headquarters Agreement and that in the interim period the status
quo would be maintained."88 The Secretary-General also informed the
International Court of Justice of Resolution 42/229B.19
The possibility that the Executive Branch could make such a recon-
ciliation ended with the letter submitted to the Secretary-General, Javier
87. The United States contention, submitted to the ICJ, was: "[T]he United States will
take no action to close the Mission pending decision in that litigation. Since the matter is still
pending in our courts, we do not believe arbitration would be appropriate or timely." Applica-
bility of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement of 26
June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 12, 29 (Advisory Opinion Apr. 26) [hereinafter Headquarters Agree-
ment Advisory Opinion]. The Court rejected this contention, in effect presuming that the
ATA was a violation of the Headquarters Agreement. See generally Reisman, Respecting
One's Own Jurisprudence: A Plea to the International Court of Justice, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 312,
312-16 (1989).
88. 42 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 136, addendum part 2) at 2, U.N. Doc. A/42/915/
Add.2 (1988).
89. Szasz, supra note 42, at 713.
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Perez De Cuellar, on March 11, 1988, by Ambassador Okun. Acknowl-
edging the adoption of Resolutions 42/229A and 42/229B, Okun wrote:
I wish to inform you that the Attorney General of the United States
has determined that he is required by the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987
to close the office of the Palestine Liberation Organization Observer
Mission to the United Nations in New York, irrespective of any obliga-
tions the United States may have under the Agreement Between the
United Nations and the United States Regarding the Headquarters of
the United Nations. If the PLO does not comply with the Act, the
Attorney General will initiate legal action to close the PLO Observer
Mission on or about March 21, 1988, the effective date of the Act....
The United States will not take other actions to close the Observer
Mission pending a decision in such litigation. Under the circum-
stances, the United States believes submission of this matter to arbitra-
tion would not serve a useful purpose.
90
It was clear that the Executive Branch had concluded that the ATA
superseded any international obligations under the Headquarters Agree-
ment and consequently that it had a responsibility to act pursuant to the
ATA. The Executive Branch could have refused and interpreted the
ATA not to apply to the Observer Mission and thus avoided the issue.
Although it did not do this, the Executive Branch managed to leave the
door open for such a result. The key operative words of Okun's letter
were: "The United States will not take other actions to close the Ob-
server Mission pending a decision in such litigation." The intention of
the Executive Branch was clear: to defer any final determination that the
United States was in a dispute pursuant to section 21 until the PLO con-
tested the action of the Attorney General in the United States courts.
The interesting possibility that might have been presented was a vic-
tory for the United States against the PLO in the American courts fol-
lowed by a demand for arbitration by the UN. In this case, the Executive
Branch would have been obliged to decide whether its international obli-
gations could, in fact, be superseded by an act of Congress subject to
review by the United States courts. If arbitration under section 21 re-
sulted in a ruling against the United States, then by which decision would
the Executive Branch have considered itself bound? Article 27 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: "A party may not
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty."91 Thus, on the international level, the Executive
90. 42 U.N. GAOR Annex 1 (Agenda Item 136, addendum part 2), supra note 88, at 4.
91. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES art. 27, at 293, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.39/11/Add.2, U.N. Sales No. E.70.V.5 (1971). Although the United States
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Branch would be obligated to accept the decision of the arbitrators even
though the United States courts had followed the last in time doctrine
under the Supremacy Clause.
92
If, on the other hand, the Executive Branch considered itself bound
by a United States court's interpretation that an act of Congress super-
seded a treaty, and refused either to arbitrate or to accept the award, the
UN would be injured by this breach of the obligation under the Head-
quarters Agreement by the United States, for which the United States
would be responsible. 93 The prospect of making such a decision is not a
comfortable one because this conflict between constitutional and interna-
tional obligations could produce a major political and legal crisis.
Okun's letter reflected this understanding and contained a not too subtly
veiled plea to let the courts in the United States try to get the Executive
Branch out of its dilemma.
The UN was pressed further by the Secretary-General's receipt of a
letter from the Permanent Observer of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion, Zuhdi Labib Terzi, which referred to a letter dated March 11, 1988,
from Edwin Meese III, Attorney General of the United States.94 The
Meese letter stated:
I am writing to notify you that on March 21, 1988, the provisions of
the 'Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987' . . . (the "ACT") will become effec-
tive. The Act prohibits, among other things, the Palestine Liberation
Organization ("PLO") from establishing or maintaining an office
within the jurisdiction of the United States. Accordingly, as of March
21, 1988, maintaining the PLO Observer Mission to the United Na-
tions in the United States will be unlawful.
has not ratified the Convention, the State Department has expressed its opinion that it codifies
the existing customary law of treaties. OFFICE OF LEGAL ADVISOR, DEP'T OF STATE, 1979
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 692-93, 703-05 (1983) (au-
thored by M. Nash); see Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29 n.5 (1982). The State Depart-
ment has also taken the view that it applies to agreements not entered into pursuant to Article
II of the Constitution. President's Message Transmitting the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, S. Exec. Doe. L., 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1971); see 2 RESTATEMENT FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) 111-I, 4 n.5 (Tent. Draft No. 6 1985)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
92. See 1 RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 135(b). "That a rule of international law or a
provision of an international agreement is superseded as domestic law does not relieve the
United States of its international obligation or of the consequences of a violation." Id.
93. See Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 1949 I.C.J.
174, 187-88 (Advisory Opinion Apr. 11). Although the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not technically cover agreements by international organizations, "[t]hese treaties
are the subject of a draft convention which has not yet been concluded but it is not likely to be
different in any major respects." L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 388.
94. 42 U.N. GAOR Annex 2 (Agenda Item 136, addendum part 2), supra note 88, at 5.
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The legislation charges the Attorney General with the responsibil-
ity of enforcing the Act. To that end, please be advised that, should
you fail to comply with the requirements of the Act, the Department
of Justice will forthwith take action in United States federal court to
ensure your compliance.
95
The reference in the Meese letter to his need to "take action in
United States federal court" as the method necessary to "ensure your
compliance" indicated that the action by the Attorney General was not
dispositive of the issue.
On March 15, the Secretary-General responded to Ambassador
Okun's letter of March 11:
As I told you at our meeting on 11 March 1988 on receiving this letter,
I did so under protest because in the view of the United Nations the
decision taken by the United States Government as outlined in the let-
ter is a clear violation of the Headquarters Agreement between the
United Nations and the United States. In particular, I cannot accept
the statement contained in the letter that the United States may act
irrespective of its obligations under the Headquarters Agreement, and
I would ask you to reconsider the serious implications of this statement
given the responsibilities of the United States as the host country.
I must also take issue with the conclusion reached in your letter
that the United States believes that submission of this matter to arbi-
tration would not serve a useful purpose. The United Nations contin-
ues to believe that the machinery provided for in the Headquarters
Agreement is the proper framework for the settlement of this dispute
and I cannot agree that arbitration would serve no useful purpose. On
the contrary, in the present case, it would serve the very purpose for
which the provisions of section 21 were included in the Agreement,
namely the settlement of a dispute arising from the interpretation or
application of the Agreement.
96
The acceptance of the Executive Branch's statements as conclusive
of the ultimate position of the United States, without review by the fed-
eral courts, was an attempt to preempt the United States judicial process
and to put the matter entirely under international law.97 Meanwhile, the
PLO Observer responded to the Attorney General on March 14, who, in
turn, replied on March 21. 9 '
95. Id. at 6.
96. 42 U.N. GAOR Annex I (Agenda Item 136, addendum part 3) at 2, U.N. Doe. A/
42/915/Add.3 (1988).
97. See Reisman, supra note 87, at 315.
98. 42 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 136) at 2, U.N. Doe. A/42/939 (1988).
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After the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly,99
the Assembly reconvened from March 18 to 23. On March 23, the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted Resolution 42/230 reinforcing many of the state-
ments in Resolutions 42/229A and 42/229B.'00 The stage was set for
litigation both in the ICJ and in United States federal courts.
V. THE ADVISORY OPINION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
On March 9, the ICJ responded to the General Assembly Resolu-
tion 42/229B with an order for the UN and the United States to submit
written statements on the issues to the ICJ.10 1 The ICJ further decided
that any other state party to the Statute of the Court could submit to the
Court a written statement on the question by March 25, 1988.102 On
April 11, 1988, the ICJ would hear oral comments on written statements
submitted to the Court by the United States and such other states.0 3
One paragraph of the order proved to be controversial. .Noting that
Resolution 42/229B (although it referred to Articles 41 and 68 of the
Statute of the Court of International Justice) did not "constitute a formal
request for the indication of provisional measures, ' ' "°4 the Court ob-
served that "it is not appropriate, in the circumstances of the case, for the
Court to consider whether or not provisional measures may be indicated
in proceedings on a request for an advisory opinion."'' 0 5 The order
continued:
Whereas the Court takes note that the General Assembly, at the meet-
ing at which it adopted resolution 42/229B requesting an advisory
opinion of the Court also adopted resolution 42/229A, by which it
'Calls upon the host country to abide by its treaty obligations under the
Agreement and to provide assurances that no action will be taken that
would infringe on the current arrangements for the official functions of
the Permanent Observer Mission of the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion to the United Nations in New York. 106
Judge Schwebel, voting in favor of the ICJ's order, voted against this
99. 42 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 136, addendum part 3), supra note 96, at 1.
100. Szasz, supra note 42, at 713.
101. Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate Under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, 1988 I.C.J. 3 (Request for Advisory Opinion Mar.
9) [hereinafter Headquarters Agreement Request for Advisory Opinion].
102. Id.
103. Id.
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paragraph and stated his reasons in a separate opinion. 107 He noted that
the Statute of the Court limited the jurisdiction of the ICJ to only the
exact question requested.
10 8
Schwebel argued that the exact question before the ICJ was
"whether the United States is under an obligation to enter into arbitra-
tion in accordance with section 21 of the Agreement between the United
Nations and the United States regarding the Headquarters of the United
Nations."' 1 9 Hence, the question was confined to a preliminary question
of procedure. The General Assembly had deliberately refrained from
asking the ICJ any questions relating to the substantive issue of whether,
under the Headquarters Agreement, the PLO Mission should be enabled
"to maintain premises and adequate functional facilities" within the
United States. 011 In Schwebel's view, this question was not submitted to
the Court deliberately, so that it would be decided exclusively under sec-
tion 21 by an arbitration tribunal with the power to render a final deci-
sion. Moreover, section 21(b) provides that either the Secretary General
of the UN or~the United States may ask the General Assembly to request
an advisory opinion of the ICJ "on any legal question arising in the
course of such [arbitral] proceedings .... Thereafter, the arbitral tribu-
nal shall render a final decision, having regard to the opinion of the
Court.""' No such question had yet been put to the Court and the ques-
tion before the Court concerned only the obligation to enter into arbitra-
tion pursuant to section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement. Therefore,
Schwebel concluded that the ICJ had erred seriously in that offending
paragraph because "that paragraph, and more explicitly the resolution
which contains it, adopts a position on that question of substance."
'"12
"Worse still," Schwebel asserted, "in the event that arbitration were to
take place between the United Nations and the United States, pursuant
to section 21,... the Court, by quoting the paragraph in question, may
have laid itself open to the charge of prejudicing that question."
' 13
Judge Schwebel was correct on this question of prejudgment. In-
deed, the learned judge may not have gone far enough. By joining in the
order, he contributed to the possible premature consideration of the pro-
cedural issue of whether the United States was required to arbitrate
107. Id. at 6.
108. Id.; ROsENNE, 2 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 699
(1965).
109. Headquarters Agreement Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 101, at 6.
110. Id.
111. Headquarters Agreement, supra note 20, § 21(b), at 100.
112. Headquarters Agreement Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 101, at 7.
113. Id
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under section 21. As long as it was possible for a federal court in the
United States to interpret the ATA in a way that allowed the PLO Mis-
sion to operate freely, an advisory opinion on the procedural question
would be a prejudgment.
Both the UN and the United States submitted written statements to
the Court. 114 On March 25, John Shad, the United States Ambassador
to the Netherlands, wrote a two-page letter to Hon. Eduardo Valencia-
Ospina, the Registrar of the Court:
The PLO Mission did not comply with the March 11 order. On
March 22, the United States Department of Justice therefore filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York to compel compliance. That litigation will afford an oppor-
tunity for the PLO and other interested parties to raise legal challenges
to enforcement of the Act against the PLO Mission. The United States
will take no action to close the Mission pending a decision in that liti-
gation. Since the matter is still pending in our courts, we do not be-
lieve arbitration would be appropriate or timely.
The United States respectfully declines the Court's invitation to submit
further views on this issue at the oral proceedings scheduled for April
11.115
On April 11, only the Legal Counsel of the UN appeared at the oral
hearings to make a statement. 1 6 On April 12, the Legal Counsel re-
sponded orally to eight questions asked the previous day by four of the
judges.1'7 On April 26, the Court's Advisory Opinion unanimously held
that the United States was under an obligation to arbitrate pursuant to
section 21 of the Headquarters Agreement.118 Judge Elias appended a
declaration and Judges Oda, Schwebel, and Shahabuddeen wrote concur-
ring opinions.' 19
The ICJ, treating the Headquarters Agreement as binding, reviewed
the entire history of the exchanges between the United States government
and the UN with regard to the ATA. The ICJ particularly relied on
statements made by officials of the United States Justice Department.
This included a press briefing held by the Assistant Attorney General in
charge of the Office of Legal Counsel:
We have determined that we would not participate in any forum,
114. Szasz, supra note 42, at 714.
115. Headquarters Agreement Request for Advisory Opinion, supra note 101, at 10.
116. Szasz, supra note 42, at 714.
117. Id.
118. Headquarters Agreement Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, at 35.
119. Id. at 35-64.
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either the arbitral tribunal that might be constituted under Article
XXI, as I understand it, of the UN Headquarters Agreement, or the
International Court of Justice. As I said earlier, the statute i.e., the
Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987 has superseded the requirements of the
UN Headquarters Agreement to the extent that those requirements are
inconsistent with the statute, and therefore, participation in any of
these tribunals that you cite would be to no useful end. The statute's
mandate governs, and we have no choice but to enforce it.'2 °
On March 14, the Permanent Observer replied to the Attorney Gen-
eral's letter of March 11, informing him of the United States action to
close the Observer Mission and reminding the Attorney General of the
United States obligations under the Headquarters Agreement and the
UN Charter. The Attorney General replied on March 21:
I am aware of your position that requiring closure of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) Observer Mission violates our obliga-
tions under the United Nations (UN) Headquarters Agreement and,
thus, international law. However, among a number of grounds in sup-
port of our action, the United States Supreme Court has held for more
than a century that Congress has the authority to override treaties and,
thus, international law for the purpose of domestic law. Here Con-
gress has chosen, irrespective of international law, to ban the presence
of all PLO offices in this country, including the presence of the PLO
Observer Mission to the United Nations. In discharging my obligation
to enforce the law, the only responsible course available to me is to
respect and follow that decision.' 2 '
The ICJ, by relying on these statements to determine the intent of
Congress, made an egregious error. Under Article 38(1) of the ICJ's
statutes, it must decide its advisory opinions or contentious cases accord-
ing to international law.'2 2 However, the ICJ must sometimes under-
stand domestic law to see if there has been a breach of international
law,'2 3 as in the Headquarter's Agreement Advisory Opinion. There was
no authority for resorting to post-enactment statements of the Executive
Branch of the United States government to determine the meaning of the
statute and the Congressional intent, however inflammatory and obsti-
120. Headquarters Agreement Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, at 23.
121. Id. at 24.
122. STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, June 26, 1945, art. 38, para 1,
59 Stat. 1055, 1060, U.S.T.S. No. 933.
123. See, e.g., Payment in Gold on Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France (Serbian
Loans Case) (Fr. v. Serbia), 1929 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20/21, at 40-47 (July 12); Payment in
Gold on Brazilian Federal Loans Issued in France (Brazilian Loan Case) (Fr. v. Braz.), 1929
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 20/21, at 93, 120-125 (July 12).
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nate those statements might be.' 2 4 A federal judge was in no way bound
by statements made by counsel for any party, including an Assistant At-
torney General, on the significance of the bill's legislative history. The
ICJ attempted to pull itself up by its own bootstraps when it commented:
The Court must further point out that the alleged dispute relates
solely to what the United Nations considers to be its right under the
Headquarters Agreement. The purpose of the arbitration procedure
envisaged by that Agreement is precisely the settlement of such dis-
putes as may arise between the Organization and the host country
without any prior recourse to municipal courts, and it would be
against both the letter and the spirit of the Agreement for the imple-
mentation of that procedure to be subjected to such prior recourse. It
is evident that a provision of the nature of section 21 of the Headquar-
ters Agreement cannot require the exhaustion of local remedies as a
condition of its implementation.
125
Further, the ICJ argued that "[f]or the purposes of the present advisory
opinion there is no need to seek to determine the date at which the dis-
pute came into existence, once the Court has reached the conclusion that
there is such a dispute at the date on which its opinion is given."'126 In
short, the ICJ concluded that a dispute existed simply because the UN
said there was one and the Attorney General insisted that the ATA ap-
plied to the PLO Mission. The intent of Congress was not considered.
Therefore, section 21 applied. The ICJ cited the Secretary General in
interpreting section 21: " 'In the first stage the parties attempt to settle
their difference through negotiation or some other agreed mode of settle-
ment .... If they are unable to reach a settlement through these means,
the second stage of the process, compulsory arbitration, becomes applica-
ble.' ",127 Emphasizing the statements by the United States Permanent
Representative and the Department of Justice that the ATA must be ap-
plied notwithstanding any international obligations under the Headquar-
ters Agreement, the ICJ concluded:
It would be sufficient to recall the fundamental principle of interna-
tional law that international law prevails over domestic law. This prin-
ciple was endorsed by judicial decision as long ago as the arbitral
award of 14 September 1872 in the Alabama case between Great Brit-
ain and the United States, and has frequently been recalled since, for
124. Consequently, opinions cited by the ICJ were not authority for its position. See Head-
quarters Agreement Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, at 27-29.
125. Headquarters Agreement Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, at 29.
126. Id. at 30.
127. Id. at 32.
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example in the case concerning the Greco-Bulgarian "Communities" in
which the Permanent Court of International Justice laid it down that
"it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in the
relations between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the
provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty[.]"
(P.C.I.J., Series B, No. 17, p. 32)128
For these reasons, the ICJ unanimously held that the United States must
enter into arbitration for the settlement of the dispute between itself and
the United Nations.
129
Two judges had strong reservations about the decision. Judge Oda
pointed to the Secretary of State's letter to Senator Dole of January 29,
1987, which stated that the United States was obligated to permit the
PLO Mission under the Headquarters Agreement. 131 In his letter of Oc-
tober 27, 1987, to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Representative
of the United States also expressed the view that the closing of the PLO
Observer Mission would violate the Headquarters Agreement. 13' Oda
reasoned that there was no dispute about the meaning of Sections 11, 12,
and 13 of the Agreement since both the UN and the United States agreed
that they prohibited the closing of the Observer Mission. He stated:
[T]he difference between the United Nations and the United States was
thus not the issue whether the forced closure of the office would or
would not violate the Headquarters Agreement, but rather the issue as
to what course of action within the United States domestic legal struc-
ture would be tantamount to the forced closure of the PLO's New
York office, in which both parties would see a violation of the
Agreement. 1
32
Oda further stated that "[t]he discussions centered on the applicability
• . . of section 21; in other words the compromissory clause itself."'
133
Since the Attorney General said the ATA required the closing of the
Observer Mission, the United Nations concluded that the existence of the
ATA violated a treaty obligation. This troubled Oda because the real
issue of the dispute was "in operative effect, precedence will be given to
the uncontested interpretation or application of that Agreement or to the
Anti-Terrorism Act as interpreted by the Attorney General of the United
128. Id. at 34.
129. Id. at 35.
130. Id. at 37.
131. Headquarters Agreement Advisory Opinion, supra note 87, at 37-38. The administra-
tion "vigorously opposed" the closing. Id. at 38.
132. Id. at 39.
133. Id. at 40.
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States."'134 According to Oda, the Court should have considered the ac-
tual effect of the Attorney General's interpretation of the ATA to deter-
mine if a real dispute existed under the Headquarters Agreement because
of a breach of the operative provisions by the ATA.135 This meant that if
the Attorney General's opinion was not final, there would be no disagree-
ment about the meaning of Sections 11, 12, and 13 as opposed to the
applicability of Section 21.
Likewise, Judge Schwebel, a former Assistant Legal Advisor of the
State Department, was not convinced that there existed a dispute about
the application of the Headquarters Agreement at this stage. He pointed
to the legislative history of the ATA:
The bill language, as I read it, does not necessarily require the closure
of the PLO Observer Mission to the United Nations, since it is an es-
tablished rule of statutory interpretation that US courts will construe
congressional statutes as consistent with US obligations under interna-
tional law, if such construction is at all plausible.
The proponents of closing the PLO mission argue that the United
States is under no legal obligation to host observer missions. If they
are right as a matter of international law, then the language in this bill
would require the closure of the PLO Observer Mission.
On the other hand, if the United States is under a legal obligation
as the host country of the United Nations to allow observer missions
recognized by the General Assembly, then the language in this bill can-
not be construed, in my opinion, as requiring the closure of the PLO
Observer Mission.
136
Schwebel concluded: "The question in the end comes to whether the
United States now is bound to arbitrate the dispute, or whether it will
only be so bound in the event that the District Court should order that
the Act be enforced against the PLO Observer Mission."' 37 This cogent
reasoning appeared to be a sufficient basis for allowing the federal courts
to have the final say about the United States position on the meaning and
the application of the ATA, and its possible conflict with the obligations
under the Headquarters Agreement. The ICJ was now faced with the
problems of obedience, since an advisory opinion is, after all, only
advisory.
On May 13, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 42/232, en-
134. Id. at 41.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 44-45 (citing 133 CONG. REC. S18,185-86 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1987) (statement of
Sen. Pell)).
137. Id. at 54.
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dorsing the ICJ's Advisory Opinion.' The Resolution noted that:
[T]he Court pointed out that "the purpose of the arbitration procedure
envisaged by that Agreement is precisely the settlement of such dis-
putes as may arise between the Organization and the host country
without any prior recourse to municipal courts, and it would be
against both the letter and the spirit of the Agreement for the imple-
mentation of that procedure to be subjected to such prior recourse.'
39
The General Assembly urged in its resolution that the host country
"abide by its international legal obligations and to act consistently with
the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, of 26 April
1988, and accordingly to name its arbitrator to the arbitral tribunal pro-
vided for under section 21 of the Agreement."'
On May 3, following the decision by the ICJ, Judge Palmieri who
was hearing the actions pending in the Southern District of New York,
requested the United States to indicate if it would "formally accept arbi-
tration under the Headquarters Agreement and agree to be bound by the
results."' 41 Notwithstanding General Assembly Resolution 42/232, As-
sistant Attorney General John R. Bolton replied: "The United States has
determined not to participate in any arbitration under section 21 and
thus, the question of compliance with an arbitral decision cannot
arise." 42
VI. MENDELSOHN v. MEESE 143
On March 23, sixty-five American citizens and organizations filed a
complaint against Attorney General Meese in the Federal District Court
of the Southern District of New York. The complaint sought both de-
claratory and injunctive relief against enforcing the ATA. The com-
plaint contained two causes of action: the first based on the
Headquarters Agreement and the second on constitutional grounds, pri-
marily the first amendment and the Bill of Attainder clause. Three plain-
tiffs, Ibraham Abu-Lughod, Victor A. Ajlouny, and Nubar Hovsepian,
all United States citizens, sought preliminary injunctions based on the
138. G.A. Res. 42/232, 42 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 136) at 1-2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/42/
232 (1988). Adopted by a vote of 136 for to two against, with Israel and the U.S. opposed, and
with no abstentions. Szasz, supra note 42, at 714.
139. G.A. Res. 42/232, supra note 138, at 1-2.
140. Id.
141. Szasz, supra note 42, at 714.
142. Letter of May 12, 1988, from John R. Bolton, Asst. Att'y Gen., to Judge Palmieri,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 799 (1988).
143. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 686 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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first amendment. 14
Both federal cases were assigned to Judge Edmund L. Palmieri, who
wanted to consolidate them. He also wanted an amicus brief from the
UN, which was not a party to either action, on the legal issues relating to
the Headquarters Agreement.
145
Lughod, Chair of the Political Science Department at Northwestern
University, asserted that he was asked to attend a meeting in New York
to explain the PLO's position on the current situation in the Middle East,
but was unable to do so unless his travel expenses were reimbursed by the
PLO.
146
Aljouny stated that he was requested by the Palestine Red Crescent
Society, a constituent group of the PLO, "to undertake a series of speak-
ing engagements in the United States with funds provided by the Pales-
tine Red Crescent Society."147 Aljouny insisted that he was unable to do
so unless his travel expenses were paid in advance.148
Hovsepian maintained that the PLO requested that he establish and
maintain an office in the United States to gather, write, and disseminate
information on the Palestinian people. He also claimed that the PLO
asked him to arrange for speakers and forums to discuss the Palestinian
people. He swore that he was prepared to open the office immediately,
had laid out his initial plans for the office, and had received commitments
from individuals for the necessary funding. These plans were "contin-
gent only on a determination that it would be lawful under the Act to
open the office."' 49
Following oral arguments on March 29, the District Court denied
the motions for preliminary injunctive relief on the cause of action based
on constitutional grounds. The motion was denied because the parties
failed to "show (1) irreparable harm and (2) either (a) a likelihood of
success on the merits or (b) both (i) that it has raised sufficiently serious
questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation
and (ii) that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in its favor."' 150 The
District Court found that postponing payment until the suit was re-
solved, even if the citizens had a protected first amendment right to have
their speaking activities subsidized by the PLO, would not irreparably
144. Id. at 77-78.
145. Szasz, supra note 42, at 714.
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harm those citizens challenging the constitutionality of a statute prohibit-
ing expenditure of PLO funds in the United States. 151 Likewise, an
American citizen contesting the constitutionality of a statute that prohib-
ited the expenditure of PLO funds in the United States was not entitled
to a preliminary injunction absent his desire to open a PLO information
office.' 52 Therefore, neither the delay in the citizen's receipt of possible
funding, nor the possibility that the office would be closed at the conclu-
sion of the litigation constituted irreparable harm.
15 3
The District Court noted, however, that Hovsepian did present a
"slightly different problem" because he was "prepared to go forward im-
mediately with the establishment of an office at the behest of the PLO,
but with no funds from the PLO."' 154 Hovsepian argued that his funders
would "not provide funds in the absence of an injunction staying the
enforcement of the statute against the office."'155 Because the ATA pro-
vided for no penalty and Hovsepian only risked the shutdown of the in-
formation office and the forced restitution of any PLO funds he received,
there was no basis for a preliminary injunction.'56
The District Court stated that there was little likelihood that the
plaintiffs would succeed on their claim based on a First Amendment
right to be subsidized to speak on issues of public importance. Therefore,
no preliminary relief would lie on these grounds either:
It is beyond argument that the interest of the United States in opposing
terrorism is a compelling one. This interest is unrelated to the preven-
tion of free expression. The Act is very specific that it is not based upon
a disagreement with the content of the message advocated by the PLO,
but is designed instead to implement Congress' determination that the
PLO is a terrorist organization and a threat to the interest of the
United States and should not benefit from operating in the United
States. 157
Finally, the District Court refused to find that the balance of hard-
ships tipped in favor of the plaintiffs.' 58 Precluding the plaintiffs from
engaging in public interests specified by Congress, weighed heavily
against the District Court's discretion to grant a preliminary injunction.
The District Court stated, " '[t]he general rule is that equity will not in-






157. Id. at 81 (citing 22 U.S.C.A. § 5201(b) (West Supp. 1988)).
158. Id.
19891
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
terfere to prevent the enforcement of a criminal statute even though un-
constitutional.' "159 "'To justify such interference there must be
exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction is nec-
essary in order to afford adequate protection of constitutional
rights.' ,160 The District Court found none of the recognized exceptions
to this rule in this case. Following the denials of these motions by the
District Court on April 12,161 the plaintiffs withdrew their motion for
preliminary relief under the Headquarters Agreement.
1 62
On June 29, 1988, Judge Palmieri decided the PLO Mission case
and the companion case of Mendelsohn v. Meese.163 Having been denied
preliminary injunctive relief in Mendelsohn, "6 the three plaintiffs were
joined in this action for a declaratory judgment in Mendelsohn v. Meese
by Riyad H. Monsour, a United States citizen employed as Deputy Per-
manent Observer at the PLO Observer Mission. Monsour was also a
party to United States v. PLO because he was a member of the Mission.
In Mendelsohn, the plaintiffs challenged the ATA on various constitu-
tional grounds. Monsour charged that if applicable to the Observer Mis-
sion, the ATA would be unconstitutional.165 The plaintiffs' second claim
sought a declaratory judgment that the ATA violated their right of free
speech and association guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Con-
stitution, as well as the U.S. Constitution's prohibition of Bills of Attain-
159. Id.
160. Id. (citing Spielman Motor Sales Corp. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95 (1935); accord
Downstate Stone Co. v. United States, 651 F.2d 1234, 1238 (7th Cir. 1981); cf Socialist Work-
ers Party v. Attorney General of the United States, 642 F. Supp. 1357, 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
(federal criminal statutes)).
161. Id. at 75 (issuing date).
162. Szasz, supra note 42, at 714. A completely separate litigation took place with regard
to the closing of the Palestine Information Office in Washington as the result of a State Depart-
ment order brought pursuant to the Foreign Missions Act, 22 U.S.C. § 4301 (1982), made
several months before the adoption of the ATA.
This action is being taken to demonstrate U.S. concerns over terrorism committed
and supported by organizations affiliated with the PLO. Among our particular con-
cerns are the continued membership of the PLO executive committee of Abu al Ab-
bas, who has been linked directly with the murder of an American citizen; the
participation in the Palestine National Congress of groups having a history of in-
volvement with terrorism - for example, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, both of which
rejoined the PLO at the April PNC .... [W]e believe [that the order] is a strong
signal of how we feel about the question of international terrorism and groups that
associate with it.
Palestine Information Office v. Shultz, 853 F.2d 932, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
163. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
164. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 686 F. Supp. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
165. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1476.
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der.'66 Other plaintiffs claimed that the ATA violated their rights to
receive information and to engage in face-to-face dialogue with Lughod
and Ajlouny.'6 7 Judge Palmieri found that these plaintiffs lacked
standing.
1 68
With regard to the other plaintiffs (Lughod, Ajlouny, Hovsepian,
and Monsour), the District Court first discounted any first amendment
rights on the part of Monsour. 1 69 Although he was asserting his First
Amendment rights as a United States citizen, Monsour was found to be
acting in his capacity as an official representative of the PLO.170 The
PLO is "an organization whose status, while uncertain, lies outside the
constitutional system."17 The District Court reasoned:
It would make no sense to allow American citizens to invoke their
constitutional rights in an effort to act as official representatives of for-
eign powers upon which the political branches have placed limits. Do-
ing so would severely hamper the ability of the political branches to
conduct foreign affairs. Any action harming the interests of a foreign
power could otherwise be challenged in court as a violation of Ameri-
cans' due process or First Amendment rights. Diplomatic relations
could not be severed, for the foreign government could enlist Ameri-
can citizens to act as its representatives.72
The District Court invoked the foreign affairs power as a basis for
this conclusion.' 73 It is questionable whether this was an appropriate
area for Congress if it is the exclusive domain of the President.
Finding that the ATA was not aimed at limiting speech, the District
Court concluded that the ATA was not a content-based restriction on
speech, and consequently, need not be subject to the "most exacting scru-
tiny." '174 Relying on United States v. O'Brien,' the District Court
stated that the First Amendment "defines parameters upon the permissi-
ble construction of the ATA."' 76 The District Court refused to accept
the Government's argument that the mere acceptance of funds from the
PLO or by association with the PLO placed Lughod, Ajlouny, and Hov-
166. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.
3.
167. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1477.
168. Id. at 1478.





174. Id. at 1483 (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
175. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
176. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1483 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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sepian in the same situation as Monsour because "the line between an
official representative of a foreign entity and an agent, 'dominated' and
'controlled' by a foreign power is one we cannot cross .... , There-
fore, the District Court held that these plaintiffs could assert First
Amendment rights. 171 In determining what was constitutionally permis-
sible for the Congress to do in the ATA, the Court construed it to validly
restrict the transfer of funds to Lughod and Ajlouny. The statute could
not, however, be construed to prohibit Hovsepian's proposed office.
17 9
The Court pointed out the meaning of the words "at the behest or direc-
tion of" in section 5202(3) of the ATA was determinative:
Hovsepian presents a different situation. The ATA, read in the
broadest possible way, prohibits Hovsepian from establishing or main-
taining his proposed informational office at the behest of the PLO.
Hovsepian has specifically averred that he will in no way be acting as
an official of the PLO. But he does wish to further the PLO's interests;
and the PLO has requested him to open his office. Were the ATA to
be read to prohibit that course of action, it would violate the require-
ment that the restriction be no greater than essential. It would be
prohibiting Hovsepian from operating in the United States, not the
PLO. The words 'behest' and 'direction' need not be given the
broadest reading possible. Indeed, a more limited approach appears
consistent with congressional intent.
180
The District Court avoided declaring any foreign affairs statute un-
constitutional because it would lead to a review of the entire national
security apparatus, in particular, the National Security Act of 1947.111
The District Court found that the ATA, while a Bill of Attainder in
form, was permissible by virtue of Congressional power in the field of
foreign affairs. The District Court noted:
The ATA reflects a sense of outrage entertained by a wide segment of
the American people and their elected officials concerning the crimes
of foreign terrorists. On its face, it is an accusatory document penaliz-
ing PLO employees by closing their offices and effectively terminating
their activities in the United States. Having been effectively singled out
by Congress, they are left without any right of reply or appeal, without
right to confront their accusers or submit evidence in an adversarial
177. Id. at 1481.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 1486.
181. 50 U.S.C. §§ 401-432 (1982). This Act established a comprehensive national security
system, including the Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Se-
curity Council, and provided for Congressional oversight of these agencies. Id.
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proceeding. They are terrorists by statutory implication but without
the slightest proof of their involvement in terrorism. In short, they are
subjected to penalties without the panoply of protective shields vouch-
safed even to criminal aliens by the federal courts in criminal trials.'
8 2
However, this was not enough to defeat the legislation. The District
Court concluded: "We believe the ATA would present a classic Bill of
Attainder were it not for the fact that, as we construe it, it is an exercise
of Congress' foreign affairs powers."'8 3 Since it does involve Congress'
foreign affairs powers, the basic reason behind the prohibition of Bills of
Attainder, the separation of powers, is not operative, because Congress
did not intend to usurp the judicial function.' 4 Finding that the ATA
did not violate the Bill of Attainder clause, 8 5 the District Court asserted:
It can be construed as an appropriate exercise of Congress' power, op-
erating, as we have explained above in the related opinion, United
States v. PLO, ante, to curb the PLO itself in the United States and not
its Mission and its personnel at the United Nations. In this sense, it
withstands First Amendment scrutiny and does not violate the Bill of
Attainder clause.
The PLO is the subject of this legislation. It effectively penalizes
individuals only in prohibiting them from acting in an official capacity
as representatives of the PLO. Congress must have the power to do
that, since the PLO, as a foreign political entity, stands outside our
constitutional structure.'
8 6
The District Court did not define the contours of this approach to
the ban on the bills of attainder, leaving it unclear how far Congress can
go under the foreign affairs power in punishing certain individuals with-
out a trial. Moreover, the ATA let the President terminate its provisions
by "certiflying] in writing to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House that the Palestine Liberation Organization, its
agents, or constituent groups thereof no longer practice or support ter-
182. Mendelsohn v. Meese, 695 F. Supp. 1474, 1487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (footnotes omit-
ted). The Court also relies on the fact that the PLO is a "foreign entity," standing outside our
constitutional structure, as a basis for finding that the ATA, which is directed at the PLO, does
not violate the prohibition against Bills of Attainder. Id. at 1488-89.
183. Id. at 1488.
184. See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965) (The ban on bills of attainder is
not to be construed as "a narrow, technical (and therefore soon to be outmoded) prohibition,
but rather as an implementation of the separation of powers, a general safeguard against legis-
lative exercise of the judicial function, or more simply - trial by legislature."); see also L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTIrUTIONAL LAW § 10-6, at 657 (2d ed. 1988).
185. Mendelsohn, 695 F. Supp. at 1489.
186. It. at 1490.
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
rorist actions anywhere in the world." '187 This could be interpreted as a
violation of the separation of powers, or simply as a joint exercise of the
foreign affairs powers by the legislative and executive branches. If it was
the latter, this would place the power of the national government at its
highest level.188 The proper role for the Court thus depended on a char-
acterization of the legislation. This was the challenge faced by Judge
Palmieri in the PLO Mission case.
VII. UNITED STATES v. PALESTINE LIBERATION
ORGANIZATION
A characterization of the ATA as an exercise of the foreign affairs
power still required the District Court to decide if there was an intention
to violate U.S. obligations under the international law created by a
treaty.
The Bar Association of the City of New York, along with the UN,
had been granted leave to appear as amici curiae.1 89 The Association
argued that the case was not yet ripe for final disposition by the District
Court, because the final resolution depended on the interpretation of the
Headquarters Agreement by arbitration. "After the arbitrators have de-
termined the scope of the Access Clause of the Headquarters Agreement,
this Court should proceed to construe the Anti-Terrorism Act to deter-
mine whether it can be reconciled with the international obligation as
thus construed."19 The Association argued that the Court should stay
187. 22 U.S.C. § 5201(b) effective date of termination (Supp. 1987).
188. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 697, 734-36 (1979); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952); United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S.
304 (1936).
189. "The court [found] that both amici ha[d] an adequate interest in the litigation, even at
the district level, and that their participation was desirable." United States v. PLO, 695 F.
Supp. 1456, 1458 n.** (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
Keith Highet and Joseph D. Pizzaro were for the United Nations, amicus curiae, while
Sheldon Oliensis, President, Saul L. Sherman, and Stephen L. Kass were for The Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, amicus curiae. For the Attorney General were Rudolph
W. Guiliani, U.S. Att'y, Richard W. Mark, Asst. U.S. Att'y, John R. Bolton, Asst. Att'y Gen.
Mona Butler, David J. Anderson, and Vincent M. Carvey. For the defendant Riyad H. Mon-
sour were Leonard B. Boudin, Michael Krinsky, David Golove, Nicholas E. Poser, and David
B. Goldstein, all of Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman. For defendants
PLO, PLO Mission, Zuhdi Labib Terzi, Riyad H. Mansour, Nasser Al-Kidwa, and Veronica
Kanaan Pugh, were Ramsey Clark, and Lawrence W. Schilling. Id. at 1457-58. Carl-August
Fleischauer, Under-Secretary-General and Legal Counsel for the United Nations was permit-
ted to address the court at the outset of the arguments of counsel that took place on June 8,
1988. Id. at 1458 n.**.
190. Amicus Curiae Brief, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York at 9, United States v.
PLO, 695 F. Supp 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
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the action. Counsel for the PLO and for the UN supported this argu-
ment."' The PLO stated that this duty to arbitrate deprived the Court
of subject matter jurisdiction.
192
Judge Palmieri rejected this argument for several significant reasons.
The decision not to arbitrate was made by the Executive Branch in an
area of international policy. 193 "The restrictions imposed upon the
courts forbidding them to resolve such questions (often termed 'political
questions') derive not only from the limitations which inhere in the judi-
cial process but also from those imposed by Article III of the
Constitution."
1 94
The district court stressed that it lacked the power to examine the
reasons for the decision not to arbitrate. To do so would involve the
district court in making foreign policy, to the embarrassment of the Ex-
ecutive. Reasoning from the standards of political questions set forth in
Baker v. Carr,195 the district court concluded that "the ultimate decision
as to how the United States should honor its treaty obligations with the
international community is one which has, for at least one hundred
years, been left to the executive to decide."' 196 Yet the district court
noted that the political question doctrine was inapplicable to its duty to
interpret the Headquarters Agreement and the ATA.' 97 "We are inter-
preting the Agreement, but are unwilling to expand the reach of its arbi-
191. Id. at 12.
192. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1461.
193. The Court also found the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)) to be applica-
ble only to "a written agreement evidencing a transaction involving commerce." Id. at 1462
n.19 (citing Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 200-01 (1956)).
194. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1462 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170
(1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individ-
uals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have
a discretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws,
submitted to the executive, can never be made in this Court.")). "The decision in Marbury has
never been disturbed." Id.
195. 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). The District Court stated: "Resolution of the question...
requires 'an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion,' would be
impossible without the Court 'expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of gov-
ernment;' and such a decision would raise not only the 'potentiality' but the reality of 'embar-
rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.'"
United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1463 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at
217).
196. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1463 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 996-97 (1979);
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 509 (1947); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302
(1918); Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 602 (1889);
accord Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1888)).
197. Id at 1463 n.22 (citing Japan Whaling Assoc. v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S.
221, 230 (1986)).
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tration clause to a point which would be inconsistent with the limitations
placed upon us by the Constitution."' 98
The district court refused to accept the argument of the Bar Associ-
ation of the City of New York for another reason. "Section 21 of the
Headquarters Agreement cannot provide a rule of decision regarding the
interpretation of that agreement ... treating it as doing so would require
the courts to refrain from undertaking their constitutionally mandated
function."' 99 This function was set forth, according to the district court,
in Marbury v. Madison in which Chief Justice Marshall said, "It is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is."200
The district court stated that "[a]s a matter of domestic law, the
interpretation of these international obligations and their reconciliation,
if possible, with the ATA is for the courts." '' The effect of the United
States international obligations, particularly the UN Charter and the
Headquarters Agreement, had to be considered in interpreting the ATA.
"That duty will not be resolved without independent adjudication of the
effect of the ATA on the Headquarters Agreement. Awaiting the deci-
sion of an arbitral tribunal would be a repudiation of that duty."20 2 The
district court found that it should not "await the interpretation of the
Headquarters Agreement by an arbitral tribunal, not yet constituted,
before undertaking the limited task of interpreting the ATA with a view
to resolving the actual dispute before it."2 3 As a result, the district court
found that it was "not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by section
21 of the Headquarters Agreement.""'
The district court pointed out that the UN had explicitly refrained
from becoming a party to the litigation. Since the arbitration provisions
of section 21 governed disputes only between the UN and the United
States, the district court found it inapplicable on its face. Had the UN
been a party, the result might have been different. If international law is
part of United States law,20 5 the district court may have been obliged to
apply the norm of pacta sunt servanda ("agreements are to be kept");
20 6
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1463.





205. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
206. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES supra note 91, art.
26, at 292. "Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by
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however, this is speculation. The district court had to reconcile the ATA
and the Headquarters Agreement, primarily as a matter of domestic law
under the Supremacy Clause and statutory interpretation. Treaties, in
this context, are not simply international obligations governed by inter-
national law, but are part of the "supreme law of the land."2 °7 What this
means in practice was ultimately the basis of the Court's decision.
The court accepted, in principal, the last in time doctrine, which "is
based on a reading of the supremacy clause which puts treaty law on the
same, but not a higher, footing as federal statutory law. Thus either may
repeal the other."2" 8 The district court stated: "Under our constitutional
system, statutes and treaties are both the supreme law of the land, and
the Constitution sets forth no order of precedence to differentiate be-
tween them."2 9 In the "Head Money" cases, Edye v. Robertson,210 the
Supreme Court stated that even self-executing clauses of a treaty are
placed in the same category as other laws of Congress.21 I The Chinese
Exclusion Case, Chae Chan Ping v. United States,212 held that the viola-
tion by the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1888 of treaties with China was not
a basis for objecting to the statute's validity. The Supreme Court
asserted:
A treaty ... is in its nature a contract between nations and is often
merely promissory in its character, requiring legislation to carry its
stipulations into effect. Such legislation will be open to future repeal or
amendment. If the treaty operates by its own force, and relates to a
subject within the power of Congress, it can be deemed in that particu-
lar only the equivalent of a legislative act, to be repealed or modified at
the pleasure of Congress. In either case the last expression of the sov-
ereign will must control.
21 3
In Whitney v. Robertson,21 4 the Supreme Court added:
When the two [treaty and statute] relate to the same subject, the courts
them in good faith." Id. It would be difficult for the PLO to argue in this case that it was a
third party beneficiary of the Headquarters Agreement in light of Articles 34, 35, and 36 of the
Vienna Convention. See id. arts. 34-36, at 294.
207. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
208. T. FRANCK & M. GLENNON, FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURrrY LAW
294 (1987). An early case establishing the "last in time" doctrine is The Cherokee Tobacco, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1870) ("A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress, and an act of
Congress may supersede a prior treaty.").
209. United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
210. 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
211. Id at 597-99.
212. 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
213. Id. at 600.
214. 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
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will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if
that can be done without violating the language of either; but if the two
are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other, provided
always the stipulation of the treaty on the subject is self-executing.2" 5
"Wherever possible, both are to be given effect," the district court
stated.2 16 Acknowledging that "Congress has the power to enact statutes
abrogating prior treaties or international obligations" of the United
States, the district court stressed that the Court had a duty to interpret
statutes consistent with treaty obligations.217 Thus, "[o]nly where a
treaty is irreconcilable with a later enacted statute and Congress has
clearly evinced an intent to supersede a treaty by enacting a statute does
the later enacted statute take precedence." '218 The origins of this rule of
construction lie in Chief Justice Marshall's decision in The Charming
Betsy:219
It has also been observed that an act of congress ought never to be
construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construc-
tion remains .... These principles are believed to be correct, and they
ought to be kept in view in construing the act now under
consideration.
220
215. Id. at 194.
216. United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1464 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Trans World
Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25,
32 (1982); Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S.
658, 690, modified, 444 U.S. 816 (1979); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22 (1963); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 510-11 (1947); Chew He-
ong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 550 (1884)).
217. Id. at 1465.
218. Id. at 1464-65 (citing Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581,
599-602 (1889) (finding clear intent to supersede); Edye v. Robertson (The Head Money
Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884) (same, decided on the same day as Chew Heong, 112 U.S.
536, 550 (1884), which found no such intent); South African Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119,
121, 125-126 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987) (Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986,
directing the Secretary of State to "terminate the Agreement Between the Government of the
United States of America and the Government of the Union of South Africa" irreconcilable
with that treaty); Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d. 461, 466 (D.C. Cir 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S.
931 (1973); cf Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (finding
no clear intent to abrogate treaty); McCulloch v. Sociedad de Marineros, 372 U.S. 10, 21-22
(1963) (same); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119-120 (1933)).
219. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 137, (1804). For a survey of
other countries following this approach, see Morgenstern, Judicial Practice and the Supremacy
of International Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 42, 83-84 (1950).
220. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 143; see also Weinberger
V. Rossi, 456 U.S. at 32 (1982). The PLO court cites a number of other cases in accord: Trans
World Airlines, 466 U.S. at 252; Washington v. Washington State Comm'l Passenger Fishing
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. at 690, Menominee Tribe of Indians, 391 U.S. at 412-13; McCulloch v.
Sociedad de Marineros, 372 U.S. at 21-22; Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953);
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In addition, the district court cited revised Restatement (Third) For-
eign Relations Law of the United States with approval:
§ 115. Inconsistency Between International Law or Agreement and
Domestic Law: Law of the United States
(1)(a) An Act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of international
law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United
States if thepurpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is
clear or if the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly
reconciled.221
In applying this principle, the district court found no clear legisla-
tive intent that Congress was directing the Executive or Judicial branches
to act in contravention of the Headquarters Agreement. "We believe the
ATA and the Headquarters Agreement cannot be reconciled except by
finding the ATA inapplicable to the PLO Observer Mission." '222
An examination of the district court's decision leads to an inquiry as
to whether the district court's need to find the ATA inapplicable to the
PLO Mission dictated its conclusions about Congressional intent. In
other words, was there any real basis for going beyond the plain meaning
of the ATA in determining if it necessitated the closing of the PLO Mis-
sion?223 Some scholars claim that "any conflict between the legislative
will and the judicial will must be resolved in favor of the former. ' 224 It
would appear that Judge Palmieri found a sufficiently tiny hole through
which to escape from the trap of forcing the closing of the PLO Mission,
allowing him to stand on existing law in reaching his conclusion. This
made it unnecessary to go beyond the traditional contours of the last in
time doctrine.
Congress can be crafty. Frequently, it enacts statutes that appear to
be straightforward, but which upon a closer examination are subject to
any number of interpretations. This is not due solely to the difficulties of
draftsmanship; it is a way of appearing to satisfy constituents without
actually doing what it appears to accomplish. This gives the courts the
opportunity to get Congress off the hook, and take the blame for suppos-
Clark v. Allen, 341 U.S. at 510; Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W.
Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 132 (1923)
(Sutherland, J., dissenting).
221. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (RE-
VISED) § 115(1)(a) (1988) (court's emphasis).
222. United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
223. Compare Church of Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1989) (showing flexi-
ble reading of statute) with Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (showing strict
adherence to statutory language).
224. R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 8 (1975).
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edly thwarting Congress' will.225 Legislative history is becoming less re-
liable because the key players in Congress know how to make statements
at key points in the bill's passage (or even after) to give their interpreta-
tion. Committee reports and Presidential statements can likewise reflect
attempts to twist legislative intent. With this continuous game, a court
can either retreat to the plain meaning rule or it can play a constructive
role in statutory interpretation by accepting the lack of clarity in both the
language and history of statutes that exists for a variety of reasons.
Courts are an inherent part of the legislative process that does not end
with the passage of a bill. An appreciation of Judge Palmieri's decision is
possible in light of the realities which he faced. His was not a radical
decision; it was traditional, even if the results are startling to some.
In determining the obligations of the United States under the Head-
quarters Agreement, particularly Sections 11 (the access clause) 12, and
13, the district court observed that "[t]he United States has, for fourteen
years, acted in a manner consistent with a recognition of the PLO's
rights in the Headquarters Agreement. This course of conduct under the
Headquarters Agreement is important evidence of its meaning. "226
Statements by the Executive Branch and the UN supported this position.
The United States Representative to the UN during consideration of a
report of the Committee on Relations with the Host Country by the Gen-
eral Assembly, declared that "the United States Secretary of State had
stated that the closing of the mission would constitute a violation of
United States obligations under the Headquarters Agreement. " 227 The
district court concluded: "It seemed clear to those in the executive
branch that closing the PLO mission would be a departure from the
United States practice in regard to observer missions, and they made
their views known to members of Congress who were instrumental in the
passage of the ATA.' ' 22" The district court also noted that both the
Department of Justice and the Department of State appeared to support
current efforts to repeal the ATA.229 The court also referred to UN
opinions that the Headquarters Agreement applied to the PLO Mission
225. See H. JONES, K. KERNOCHAN, & A. MURPHY, LEGAL METHOD 348 (1980) ("It
sometimes becomes necessary as a matter of political compromise to eliminate some precise
key-word in the bill and substitute for it some less exact term, chosen deliberately to leave a
controversial issue to the courts for decision.")
226. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1466, (citing O'Connor v. United States, 479 U.S. 27, 33 (1986)).
227. 42 U.N. GAOR C.6 (58th mtg.) para. 3, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/42/SR.58 (1987).
228. United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1467 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
229. Id. at 1467 n.25.
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and to General Assembly Resolutions 42/20, 42/229A, and 42/232.230
The government urged a literal application of the maxim leges pos-
teriores priores contrarias abrogant; in the event of conflict between two
laws, the one of later date will prevail. In reconciling the ATA and the
Headquarters Agreement, Judge Palmieri specifically rejected this ap-
proach.23 Citing a long line of cases, he concluded that "Congress' fail-
ure to speak with one clear voice on this subject requires us to interpret
the ATA as inapplicable to the Headquarters Agreement. 2 32 Palmieri
justified his conclusion with three arguments:
First, Congress did not mention either the PLO Mission or the Head-
quarters Agreement in the ATA. The court found the absence of spe-
cific references to the Mission and Headquarters Agreement in the
ATA particularly significant because, prior to passage of the statute,
the State Department had informed Congress of its view that closure of
the PLO Mission would be inconsistent with the obligations of the
United States under the Headquarters Agreement. Second, the ATA's
provisions prohibiting maintenance of PLO office applied "notwith-
standing any provision of law to the contrary," but did not purport to
apply notwithstanding any treaty. Third, a review of the legislative his-
tory of the ATA indicated that no member of Congress had expressed
a clear and unequivocal intent to supersede the Headquarters Agree-
ment. The only debate on the issue focused on whether the United
States had an obligation to provide access to the PLO, and every pro-
ponent of the ATA argued, under a misapprehension, that no such
obligation existed under the Headquarters Agreement.233
The first point is obvious. There is no mention of the PLO Mission
or the Headquarters Agreement in the legislation. Therefore, the Execu-
tive Branch's argument that closing the PLO Mission would violate
United States obligations under the Headquarters Agreement could be
perceived to have taken effect in Congress, but for the sweeping language
of the ATA. Although the word "treaty" is not mentioned, Section
5202(3) does state that it shall be unlawful "notwithstanding any provi-
sion of law to the contrary, to establish or maintain an office, headquar-
ters, premises, or other facilities or establishments. ' 234 The district court
found the absence of any interpretive instruction significant because else-
where in the same legislation Congress expressly referred to "United
230. 1979 U.N. JURID. Y.B." 169-70, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.C/17; see 1980 U.N. Ju-
RID. Y.B. 188, U.N. Doe. ST/LEG/SER.C/18.
231. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1469.
232. Id. at 1468.
233. Koenig, supra note 37, at 835-36 (1988).
234. 22 U.S.C. § 5202(3) (Supp. 1987).
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States law (including any treaty)".235
If, as Palmieri suggested, the last in time doctrine is still good law,
laws and treaties are equal based on domestic law. If this is so, it is likely
that Congress intended the term "law" to cover both Congressional legis-
lation and treaties.
Whether this is a real or constructive ambiguity revolves around the
third argument, that "no member of Congress expressed a clear and une-
quivocal intent to supersede the Headquarters Agreement by the passage
of the ATA. ' '236 This presents an apparent contradiction in the decision.
Palmieri argued that most people who "addressed the subject of conflict
denied that there would be a conflict: in their view, the Headquarters
Agreement did not provide the PLO with any right to maintain an of-
fice."'2 37 Palmieri had already explained how the Executive Branch had
informed Congress that there was an obligation under the Headquarters
Agreement to keep the PLO Mission open and that the ATA would, as
drafted, violate that obligation. Therefore this position by most who ad-
dressed the subject of conflict is not a misapprehension, but a rejection of
the position of the Executive Branch. Palmieri concluded that, "Con-
gress provided no guidance for the interpretation of the ATA in the event
of a conflict which was clearly forseeable.
2 31
The district court found its interpretation consistent with its view of
the nature of the legislative history. Senator Claiborne Pell, Chair of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who voted for the bill, had raised
the possibility that the Headquarters Agreement would take precedence
over the ATA if there was a conflict.23 9 The Senate did not even debate
Pell's suggestion, even though it came in the final minutes before passage
of the ATA.24
Judge Palmieri does not deny the awareness in Congress of a poten-
tial conflict between the ATA and the Headquarters Agreement. How-
ever, in his opinion, most members of Congress believed the closing of
the PLO Mission would not violate the Agreement. This was probably
sufficient to assure that his decision would not be overturned on appeal.
To do so, the Court of Appeals would have to find that his "careful and
convincing review of the legislative history was erroneous.... 241 Con-
235. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 100-204, § 128, 101 Stat. 1343
(1987).
236. United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1468-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
237. Id. at 1469.
238. Id.
239. 133 CONG. REC., supra note 11, at S18,185-86.
240. PLO, 695 F. Supp. at 1469.
241. Koenig, supra note 37, at 836.
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gress could always amend or "reenact the ATA with a clear statement of
intent"242 to shut the PLO Mission. This gave the Second Circuit less
motivation to hear the district court's decision on appeal.
The district court refused to strike the ATA down entirely, finding it
remained "a valid enactment of general application" '243 that restricted
"PLO activity in the United States," 2' apart from its inapplicability to
the PLO Mission.
The United States decided not to appeal the district court's decision.
On August 29, 1988, the United States announced that this was being
done "in light of foreign policy considerations, including the U.S. role as
host to the United Nations Organization. ' 245 According to a New York
Times article, the President personally resolved the appeal issue, overrid-
ing the Justice Department.246
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ICJ was premature. Advisory opinions can be given at the re-
quest of the General Assembly even though a real controversy underlies
them. However, advisory opinions should not be given until the local
court has spoken on the meaning and applicability of the offending legis-
lation. The Executive Branch in the United States could have withheld
action. It should have relied on the canon of construction in The Charm-
ing Betsy for a means to avoid violating United States treaty obligations.
Some sympathy still remains for the Attorney General since he clearly
wished to let the federal courts have the final say without provoking Con-
gress to even greater specificity. This closed the door to any interpreta-
tion pursuant to The Charming Betsy canon. Judge Palmieri correctly
relied on this canon. This must be a strong presumption rebutted only by
242. Id.
243. United States v. PLO, 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1471 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
244. Id.
245. N.Y. Times, Aug. 30, 1988, at Al, col. 8 (Justice Department statement).
246. Id The New York Times reported:
State Department officials said their desire to avoid closing the PLO mission was
based on their reading of American obligations to the United Nations, and was not
significantly affected by recent statements from various P.L.O. figures saying that
their organization was considering formation of a provisional government or a gov-
ernment in exile in the territories occupied by Israel. Such a provisional P.L.O. re-
gime might recognize Israel's existence as a state.
But department officials said they tended to agree with Arab diplomats, who
warned that the United States would set back Middle East peace efforts if it persisted
in trying to close the P.L.O. mission.
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the clearest language conveying Congressional intent to override the
treaty with' subsequent legislation.
Finally, the last in time doctrine might be obsolete, a remnant of an
outdated notion of sovereignty that views international relations as a jun-
gle rather than as a law-governed system in which all branches of govern-
ment of a nation-state are bound by its valid international agreements.
The only way such agreements lose their force is by a valid termination
pursuant to international law.247 While Palmieri's decision does not go
this far, it challenges Congress to decide if it wishes to break interna-
tional law.248 To those who read his decision to be a usurpation of the
legislative function, his understanding of The Charming Betsy canon of
construction makes it a rule that virtually under no circumstances can
Congress have such intent unless it surprisingly expresses its will with
total clarity. Such an approach is palatable and a reenforcement of the
global norm of pacta sunt servanda, without which treaties are
meaningless.
247. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 91, art.
42-72, at 295-99; Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 706 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) vacated on other
grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). While the President could veto legislation that specifically over-
turns a treaty, that veto could be overridden by Congress, giving the legislative branch the
power, in effect, to terminate a treaty alone, raising serious questions about the foreign rela-
tions powers of the president. See id. at 996; United States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299
U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936); Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d. 1109, 1110 (10th Cir. 1977); cf. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952).
Moreover, Congress has no need for such a power to overturn a treaty it believes violates
the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, as this is the proper province of the courts. See Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-9 (1957) (supremacy clause and executive agreements); cf. Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
248. Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S. 114 (1936).
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